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Abstract
If a wave function does not describe microscopic reality then what does?
Reformulating quantum mechanics in path-integral terms leads to a notion
of “precluded event” and thence to the proposal that quantal reality differs
from classical reality in the same way as a set of worldlines differs from
a single worldline. One can then ask, for example, which sets of electron
trajectories correspond to a Hydrogen atom in its ground state and how
they differ from those of an excited state. We address the analogous
questions for simple model that replaces the electron by a particle hopping
(in discrete time) on a circular lattice.
Keywords and phrases: quantum foundations, histories, path-integral, co-
event formulation, anhomomorphic coevents, quantum logic.
Should we try to form for ourselves an image of the quantum world? Or must our theories
find their meaning solely in assertions about laboratory instruments and their readings?
In other words, is it permissible to ask the question, To what ‘reality’ does the quantum
formalism refer? I believe that this question is not only a legitimate one, but it is one that
we must ask. If we try to avoid it, we fall into a vicious circle because instruments are made
of atoms and not vice versa. More importantly, quantum gravity and, especially, cosmology
⋆
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need to deal with parts of nature where one finds neither observers nor instruments, and
to which an “operational point of view” therefore seems unsuited.
Beyond the more or less familiar reasons just adduced to support the claim that the
problems of quantum gravity and “quantum foundations” are intertwined, there’s another
connection that could be important via the concept of relativistic causality. If the condition
that “physical influences propagate causally” could be given an intrinsic formulation, free
of references to external observers, and if the resulting criterion were formulated in terms
of histories (as Bell’s “local causality” is, for example), then one should be able to decide
whether or not quantum mechanics and quantum field theory satisfied this condition. If
they did, then it would make sense to require it also of quantum gravity, and this in turn
could be the key to constructing a viable quantum dynamics for causal sets.
Perhaps the challenge of “quantum foundations” is not so urgent for quantum com-
puting, which is concerned more with the manipulation of information than with micro-
scopic reality as such. But even there, it seems possible that a more definite picture of
the micro-world could someday lead us to widen our conceptions of measurement and of
computation.
What I hope to illustrate in this paper is a possible answer to the italicized question
posed above, an answer that arose from thinking of quantum mechanics in the language
of histories, i.e. the language of the path integral. According to this answer, the micro-
world is described by something called a coevent , but instead of attempting to define that
concept in the general case, I will consider a very simple model of a particle hopping on a
lattice, and in that setting, will present a short calculation that I hope will indicate more
concretely how the proposal is meant to go. In the particular scheme I will present, reality
will be something like a trajectory or worldline of the hopping particle, but instead of being
a single trajectory, as in classical physics, it will be a set of trajectories. This particular
choice is not necessarily the best one, but it is the simplest and therefore appropriate to
illustrate the main idea.
Notice that in a coevent formulation, reality is not represented by a wave function ψ.
Therefore, although a concept like position will have a straightforward meaning, a concept
like momentum or energy will not. But then we have to ask how an electron in a hydrogen
atom “knows” for example, whether the atom is in its ground state or in an excited state.
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Is there something about the trajectories that carries this information? Hence the title of
this paper.
I. A simple unitary model — the n-site hopper
A simple model allowing one to refer to trajectories and ground/excited states is the “n-
site hopper”, by which I mean a particle residing on an n-site periodic lattice, and at
each of a discrete succession of moments either staying where it is or jumping to some
other site, the respective amplitudes being those given by the simple “transfer matrix”
reproduced below. [1][2] In this “toy world”, nothing exists beyond the hopper itself, and
since both space and time are discrete, the possible realities or coevents can be computed
with minimal difficulty.
In order to describe the hopping amplitudes, let us identify the nodes of the lattice
with the elements of Zn, the integers modulo n. Further let x ∈ Zn be the location of
the particle at some moment and let x′ be its location at the next moment, and write for
brevity exp(2πiz) ≡ 1z . The amplitude to go from x to x′ in a single step is then
1√
n
1(x−x
′)2/n (1a)
for n odd, and
1√
n
1(x−x
′)2/2n (1b)
for n even. For example, for n = 6 and with q = 11/12, the (un-normalized) amplitudes to
hop by 0, 1, 2 or 3 sites respectively are q0 = 1, q1 = q, q4, and q9 = −i.
It is not difficult to verify that these amplitudes (more precisely the matrix they
comprise) are unitary. Interestingly, they take precisely the form of the propagator of a
non-relativistic free particle in one-dimension, suggesting that in a suitable n→∞ limit,
this hopper model could provide a fully self-consistent regularization of the path-integral
for such a particle.
For the 2- and 3-site hoppers, the amplitudes are particularly simple, yielding for
n = 3 the matrix
1√
3

 1 ω ωω 1 ω
ω ω 1

 (ω = 11/3)
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and for n = 2 the matrix
1√
2
(
1 i
i 1
)
.
II. Review of anhomomorphic coevents and the “Multiplicative Scheme”
In the formulation I am advocating, “nature” is represented in terms of histories, which for
present purposes means trajectories of the hopping particle. [3][4][5] Physical reality — a
“possible world” — is then described by a coevent which specifies which events happen and
which don’t, where an event is by definition a set of histories.⋆ More formally, a coevent
will be a function φ that assigns either 0 or 1 to each event, according as the event doesn’t
or does happen in the world described by φ.
From this perspective, our description of the physical world would be complete if we
were able to specify fully the actual coevent φ. The role of “dynamics”, then, is to help us
toward a fuller such specification by placing conditions on φ that narrow down the range
of possibilities that need to be considered. I will assume that the input to this dynamics
takes the form of a path integral (or in the case of the hopper, a path sum). Wave functions
ψ, insofar as they play a role at all, will provide provisional initial amplitudes that go into
the computation of the path-sum (as an approximate summary of past).
But is it possible to base a dynamics on a path-sum alone? If we wish to do so then,
plainly, we must construe the latter as something more than a technical device to compute
transition amplitudes between some initial wave-function and some final one. Instead we
will interpret it as providing for any event A, the quantal measure µ(A) of that event.†
Once again, I will omit the formal definition [6][7][8], since we will see very soon how
concretely to compute µ(A) in the case at hand.
⋆ not to be confused with the word “event” used to denote a point of spacetime. The
definition here follows the usage in probability theory, which in turn is more in tune with
the everyday meaning of the word.
† µ(A) is also known as the diagonal element of the decoherence functional D(A,A).
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The preclusion principle
It is not hard to convince oneself that in one special case µ(A) has the meaning of an
ordinary probability, namely when the event A can be described as a possible outcome
(“instrument reading”) of a given laboratory experiment. In such a case, the analyses
of numerous gedankenexperiments over the years have made it plausible (albeit people
don’t always express it this way) that µ(A) coincides with the Born-rule probability of
the outcome A. But if this is accepted, then it follows immediately that a zero value
of µ(A) implies that the corresponding instrument-event almost surely does not occur —
it is precluded .♭ Extending this conclusion to the case of an arbitrary — macroscopic
or microscopic — event, we arrive at a dynamical principle of general applicability: If
µ(A) = 0 then the event A cannot happen.
Preclusion and primitivity
The preclusion principle requires of any dynamically viable coevent φ that it deny every
event whose quantal measure vanishes: φ(A) = 0 if µ(A) = 0. We have seen that this
principle flows naturally from the path-integral, but by itself it is still rather weak, in the
sense that a vast number of coevents can satisfy it even when preclusions abound. In our
hopper example, for instance, we will have 27 histories, and consequently 22
27
= 2134217728
coevents in toto. The number of precluded events is also large (2017807), but even so,
there remain 2132199921 coevents which are preclusive in the sense that they satisfy our
condition. On the other hand, 2132199921 is only a tiny fraction of 2134217728, so one might
feel on the contrary that the preclusion principle is rather strong.
Be that as it may, I think the weightiest reason why the preclusion principle cannot
stand alone is that it seems incapable of yielding the classical conception of reality-as-
a-single-history when the measure µ is classical (and possibly “deterministic”). Thus,
preclusion alone would not exclude coevents for which an experiment had more than one
macroscopic outcome, or for which no definite outcome at all happened. In other words it
would not resolve the “measurement problem”.
♭ To this extent, µ(A) is a sort of “propensity” for the event A to happen. One cannot
go further and interpret it as a genuine probability, because, thanks to quantal interference,
it is not additive on disjoint events.
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To complete the dynamical story, then, we will supplement preclusion with a further
principle of “minimality” or primitivity designed to remedy the deficiencies just cited. How
properly to frame such a supplementary condition is a question not yet settled, but the
simplest proposal is that of the so-called multiplicative scheme, and this is the one I will
adopt for the present analysis.
Figure 1. Three events and a multiplicative coevent. The three events
are three sets of histories, A, B, C, while the coevent φ corresponds to
a further set of histories F called its support . In the “reality” described
by φ, A happens, while B and C do not happen. In formulas, φ = F ∗,
φ(A) = 1, and φ(B) = φ(C) = 0 .
the multiplicative scheme
Classical physics identified reality with a single history, but that no longer seems possible
quantum mechanically because the characteristic phenomenon of interference produces
non-classical patterns of preclusion which seem to demand a modified conception of reality.
In place of a single history, the multiplicative scheme describes the physical world by
a coevent of the form φ = F ∗, where F is now a set of histories that reduces to a singleton
set only in very special (effectively classical) circumstances. As illustrated in figure 1, the
coevent F ∗ assigns 1 (‘true’) to an event A if and only if A is a superset of F . Thus in the
diagram, if φ = F ∗ then φ(A) = 1 while φ(B) = φ(C) = 0 . When φ = F ∗ I will refer to F
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as the support of φ . Within the multiplicative scheme, a coevent is thus fully determined
by its support.⋆
Now when is a coevent φ = F ∗ “dynamically viable” within the multiplicative scheme?
By assumption it must be preclusive, and this means precisely that its support F must
not fall wholly within any precluded event. Beyond this, we require further that F be as
small as possible consistent with the preclusivity condition just stated. A coevent (or its
support) that fulfills all these conditions I will call primitive preclusive, or for short just
primitive. A primitive coevent thus describes a “possible world”, where “possible” is to be
understood relative to the given set of preclusions.
One sees immediately that in the absence of any preclusions (other than the empty
event itself) a primitive preclusive support will consist solely of a single history, and the
same holds whenever the pattern of preclusions is of the type that occurs in either classical
deterministic, or classically stochastic theories. Much more than this could be said about
the multiplicative scheme and its consequences, [9][10][11] but now I want to focus on a
very concrete example and on our specific question: Does the particle know its own energy?
III. Histories and amplitudes for the 3-site hopper
In simple cases, preclusion is decided by whether the sum of the amplitudes vanishes. This
will be true for our example, and it will make it easy to find the primitive supports.
To simplify as much as possible, let the hopper take three steps and then stop. And let
there be nothing else in the world beside this hopper. Our space of histories then comprises
exactly 81 trajectories, depending on where the hopper starts from and where it lands at
each of the three subsequent moments. In fact, however, we only need to consider the 27
histories shown in figure 2, because one can prove, as a general feature of the multiplicative
scheme, that any primitive support must correspond to a sharp final position. That is, one
of the three events, “the hopper terminates at 0”, “the hopper terminates at 1”, or “the
hopper terminates at 2”, must happen. Without loss of generality we can suppose it is the
first of these events, and this is what the figure illustrates.
⋆ A little thought should convince you that the rule that φ(A) = 1 iff F ⊆ A also holds
classically, with F being the set that contains the “actual history” as its sole element.
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With the final position fixed at x = 0, it is also very easy to decide whether a given
set of histories is precluded: this occurs iff the amplitudes of the constituent histories sum
to zero. To work out the pattern of preclusions, it thus suffices to know all the amplitudes.
Now given a history γ, its net amplitude is the amplitude it inherits from its starting
location, multiplied by the amplitudes of the individual hops, the former being given by
what one might call the “initial wave-function” ψinitial. For ψinitial let us consider two
possible choices, ψ0 and ψ+, which we may call by way of analogy “ground state” and
“traveling wave”. The amplitudes for these are respectively (ψ(0), ψ(1), ψ(2)) = (1, 1, 1)
and (ψ(0), ψ(1), ψ(2)) = (1, ω, ω2), where ω = 11/3 as before. Clearly both ψ0 and ψ+ are
eigenvectors of the “transfer matrix” defined earlier. (The overall normalization of ψinitial
is immaterial since it has no effect on preclusion.)
It is now straightforward to compute the amplitudes of our 27 histories in each case.
The figure exhibits them for the traveling wave, and those for the ground-state are similar
(but even simpler to compute since the dependence on the starting position is absent.)
Curiously, the amplitudes per se (though not of course the way they are distributed among
the histories) turn out to be exactly the same for both cases. Counting them up, one obtains
the following multiset:
ω{12} 1{9} ω{6} ,
meaning 12 histories with amplitude ω2 = ω, 9 with amplitude 1, and 6 with amplitude ω.
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Figure 2. The 27 histories, and their amplitudes for the case of the “travel-
ing wave”. Each path indicated by an arrow represents from 1 to 3 possible
histories differing from each other by the moments at which the hopper
chooses to rest. The resulting multiplicity is shown under the triangle,
while the number inside the triangle is the amplitude itself.
9
IV. Primitive coevents for the ground state and the traveling wave
Which combinations of the histories illustrated in figure 2 yield primitive coevents? If we
think in terms of the amplitudes abstractly, it is easy to answer this question, and the
same answer will then apply unchanged to both cases of traveling wave and ground state.
An event E will correspond to a set of amplitudes (strictly speaking a multiset), and E
will be precluded precisely when the amplitudes sum to zero. Because the only real-linear
relation among the complex numbers 1, ω, ω is 1 + ω + ω = 0, this will occur when, and
only when, the three amplitudes occur in equal numbers within E. It is then easy to see
what are the maximal precluded multisets of amplitudes. They are those consisting of 6
copies each of 1, ω, and ω.
Now let F be the support of a preclusive coevent. In order to be preclusive, F must
not fall wholly within any precluded event, and this means that it must not be possible
to adjoin further amplitudes to those of F such that the resulting multiset sums to zero.
Plainly F will be protected in this way iff it contains at least 7 copies of 1 or 7 copies
of ω. On the other hand, we also want F to be primitive, meaning minimal among the
preclusive supports. Again it is easy to see what this means: it must comprise precisely 7
copies of 1 or 7 copies of ω.
In this way, we find a total of
(
12
7
)
+
(
9
7
)
= 828 primitive coevents of the multiplicative
form φ = F ∗, each made up of a total of 7 histories.
In the case of the traveling wave, for example, one such set of histories corresponds
to the last three patterns in the first row of figure 2. Interestingly, all seven of these
trajectories move in the positive (counterclockwise) direction and none of them in the
contrary direction. Thus the event, P = “The particle circulates exclusively in the positive
sense”, happens in the reality described by this coevent.
Happily enough, this sense of circulation corresponds perfectly with the “phase veloc-
ity” of ψ+, but we cannot assert that all of the 828 traveling-wave coevents also affirm this
same event P . In order to quantify the tendency toward counterclockwise motion, then,
let us associate a “net circulation” with each coevent, as the total number of “forward”
hops less the total number of “backward” ones. (So for example the above coevent has a
net circulation of 3×1+3×2+1×3 = 12.) Averaging this quantity over all 828 primitive
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coevents yields an average net circulation of 7/23. A tendency toward counterclockwise
motion is therefore present but not extremely pronounced – just as one might expect since
a lattice of only n = 3 positions can lend no more than a very rudimentary meaning to a
derivative like “d(phase)/d(angle)”.
The primitive preclusive coevents for the ground-state are again supported on sets of
seven histories, as we have already remarked. By symmetry we cannot expect a favoured
sense of circulation in this case, but it is also interesting to ask how “restless” the particle
proves to be. Here, it is natural to compare with “Bohmian” or “pilot wave” conceptions
of reality, since they also give meaning to the notion of particle-trajectory. As far as I
know, the Bohmian “guidance equation” is limited to continuum space and time, where
the nearest analog to our hopper ground-state might be the ground-state of a particle in a
box. Since the phase of the Schro¨dinger wave-function is independent of position in that
case, the Bohmian particle does not move at all. Rather than explore its surroundings, it
just stays put, wherever it happens to find itself.†
It turns out that the coevents of the multiplicative scheme paint a very different
picture. The event, “The hopper never moves” is of course denied by all 828 coevents,
while the contrary event that “The hopper never rests” is affirmed by eight of them. (For
such a coevent, all seven of the histories in its support are in constant motion.) Of the other
820 primitive coevents, 28 of them affirm that the hopper either never rests or never moves
(6 histories vs. 1), while the remaining 792 primitive supports consist entirely of histories
such that the hopper rests once and hops twice. Moreover, for none of the coevents does
the event “the hopper avoids some lattice-site” happen.♭ All in all, very peripatetic indeed.
† The first excited state, and indeed every standing wave of pure frequency, also leads
to static trajectories. In this sense a Bohmian particle in a box with reflecting walls would
be about as far as possible from knowing its own energy. However, the strictly stationary
wave-functions are very special, and their superpositions might generically lead to different
typical trajectories. [12]
♭ Which of course doesn’t mean that the complementary event, “the hopper visits all
three lattice sites” ever happens either. That’s why the coevents are “anhomomorphic”:
with φ = F ∗ defined as above, it can easily happen that two events A and B are comple-
mentary subsets of the space of histories, but both φ(A) and φ(B) vanish.
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V. Does the hopper know its energy?
If the multiplicative scheme (or any other coevent scheme) is a kind of “equation of motion
for coevents”, then a primitive preclusive coevent is a kind of “solution of the equations of
motion”. In celestial mechanics such a solution would be the orbit of a planet. One can
deduce the binding energy of the planet from a knowledge of its orbit, but the converse is
impossible since the energy is only one among a number of orbital parameters. Now con-
sider some microscopic counterpart of this problem, like a hydrogen atom. By analogy one
should not expect to deduce a unique coevent φ from a knowledge of the total energy, but
one might wonder whether, conversely, the coevent determines the energy unambiguously.
Quantum mechanically, energies are determinate only for eigenfunctions of the Hamil-
tonian operator, and the nearest analogs for these in our hopper-world are the initial-
amplitude sets, ψ0 and ψ+ (plus, of course, the parity-reversed set ψ−, together with
linear combinations like the “standing wave”, ψ+ + ψ−). We are thus led to ask whether
the primitive coevents pertaining to ψ0 overlap with those pertaining to ψ+. To the extent
that the answer is negative one can indeed deduce the hopper’s energy from a knowledge
of the coevent that describes its motion. Based on the above analysis of the primitive
coevents, the required calculation is straightforward, and the result is that the degree of
overlap is zero. No coevent is common to both ψ0 and ψ+.
Moreover it is possible to distinguish ψ0 from ψ+ in terms of relatively elementary
consequences. For example if the hopper never rests (meaning φ(E) = 1, where E is the
event consisting of the fourth, seventh, and tenth through fifteenth histories shown in figure
2), then φ pertains to ψ = ψ0. Similarly, if the hopper moves only counterclockwise, or if
it rests exactly once, then ψ = ψ+.
In this sense, we can say that the hopper does know its own energy. We can also say
that it “knows its own angular momentum”, since a similar comparison reveals that the
primitive coevents pertaining to ψ+ are disjoint from those pertaining to ψ−.
Of course the example we’ve studied is exceptionally simple, both with respect to
the hopping amplitudes and the amplitudes of the “initial states” ψinitial which we have
considered. It would be good to analyze also the case of the standing wave, and more
generally to extend the analysis to include longer times, and larger lattice sizes n. (The
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case of shorter times is also instructive. For only two time-steps, one finds that there do
exist primitive coevents common to ψ+ and ψ0. This strengthens the impression that with
the passage of time the hopper would “know” more and more about ψinitial.)
Our hopper-world is exceptionally simple in another way too, that relates to the radical
inseparability (or “interconnectedness”) that seems to show up in the quantum world. Were
we to include a second system or process in our idealized world, say for example a four-site
hopper, the coevents would change. Obviously the global coevents would change, but even
those induced for the three-site hopper would in general be different. This at least is a
feature of the multiplicative scheme, and it is likely true more generally. It is therefore
important to study extensions of our model of this type.
Extensions of our model in any of the directions just mentioned would of course be
interesting. But even without them, I hope the examples studied in this paper suffice to
illustrate how one can start to think about the quantum world without invoking the ideas
of either evolving wave-functions or external observers.
If these examples are not misleading us, then we can already draw some conclusions
of more general validity, concerning first of all the relation between wave-functions and
descriptions of reality. A histories-based or “path-integral” formulation of the sort we
have been working with has no use for the Schro¨dinger equation at a fundamental level.
The basic concept of precluded event has a “spacetime character” and refers directly to
the histories and their amplitudes, not to any evolving wave-function. On the other hand,
something like a wave-function does enter into the “initial conditions” needed in setting up
the path-integral. In principle one should probably replace these initial amplitudes with
cosmological boundary conditions imposed directly on the histories, but in our hopper-
world there is no moment earlier than t = 0, and we have assumed instead that in a more
complete model, we would be able to condense the effect of the true boundary conditions
into a set of three initial amplitudes for the hopper at t = 0. This is the wave-function
ψinitial in its role as “effective summary of the past”.
What our hopper model teaches us about ψinitial is that it is far from furnishing
a detailed description of physical reality. Rather, the coevent which by definition does
furnish such a description is determined by ψinitial only to a very limited extent. Reality
possesses far more “internal structure” than is reflected in a wave-function.
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This observation in turn resolves an old paradox that has recently been emphasized
in a cosmological setting by Daniel Sudarsky [13]. In its terrestrial form the paradox asks
how the spherically symmetric wave-function resulting from the decay of a spinless nucleus
can be compatible with the fact that the daughter nuclei will be found to be localized in
angle if one sets up detectors. How does the symmetry break? But in terms of coevents,
there’s no problem. Just because the ψ-function is symmetric, that doesn’t imply the
same of the individual coevents. Indeed, we see exactly such a phenomenon in our hopper
model, where ψinitial exhibits perfect rotational symmetry while the individual coevents
are completely asymmetric. No single coevent shares the symmetry of ψinitial, but only
the ensemble of all 3× 828 of them taken together.
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